Retrofitting a Bad Deal: Congress’s Ability, and Responsibility, to Cure Defects in the Iran Deal

David R. Lurie* and Robert Steinbuch**


The nuclear deal that President Obama has struck with the theocratic dictatorship of Iran will dramatically reverse policies of the United States toward that regime, as reflected in legislation enacted over several years by bipartisan votes in Congress.

First, while the Congress has committed the U.S. to seeking the permanent termination of Iran’s nuclear weapons and other weapon of mass destruction (WMD) activities, the President’s deal will expressly recognize Iran’s “right” to maintain an industrial uranium enrichment infrastructure and to buy and manufacture intercontinental ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons to targets around the world, including the United States; and,

Second, while Congress has definitively committed the U.S. to seeking to end Iran’s sponsorship of international and state terrorism, the administration has undermined that policy, including by deliberately avoiding confrontation with Iran’s Hezbollah proxy army, even as it has been orchestrating mass murder campaigns in Syria.[1] The deal will also directly provide Iran with billions of dollars in resources to expand its support of terror and subversion throughout the greater Middle East, even assuming arguendo that the President is correct in his dubious assumption that the regime will devote the wealth of the windfall to internal economic development.[2]

Furthermore, the foregoing only speaks to a rosy, and highly unlikely, scenario in which Iran’s theocrats do not systematically cheat, as they have on each and every other WMD agreement they have reached in the past. In that case, Iran could well end up with multiple bombs, or the nuclear fuel needed to create them rapidly, during the time-limited pendency of the deal, even as the regime continues to rake in billions of dollars in oil revenues, which will further fund its campaigns of subversion and state terror.

Few even of the President’s staunchest advocates expend much effort seeking to bolster the President’s contention his deal is the very best that could have ever been struck with the Iranian theocracy. This is especially the case given that the growing economic crisis caused by the U.S.-led sanctions regime has forced the regime’s “Supreme Leader” to accept the installment of a government expressly committed to obtaining the end of the sanctions.

The President and his allies suggest that the Iranian regime was in a position akin to that of the Soviet Union during past arms control negotiations, and that – as in the case of that former superpower – the U.S. simply lacked the leverage to pressure the Iranian theocracy to dismantle its industrial nuclear infrastructure. The President’s refusal to acknowledge the critical difference between a negotiation with a nuclear weapons state undertaken for the purpose of reducing the size or nature of its massive weapons stockpile versus a negotiation with a rogue regional theocracy bearing the brunt of punishing sanctions and desperate for international stature is strikingly disingenuous, and therefore has been given little credence.

Faced with the patent weakness of their claim that the President obtained the best deal possible, the President’s advocates rely on the patently incorrect proposition that there is now a binary choice between moving forward with the bad deal that is on the table and going to war with an Iranian regime bent on rapidly building a fleet of nuclear warheads bearing missiles.

The contention that the rejection of the President’s deal would be tantamount to a choice for immediate war is also unconvincing and has been publicly rejected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[3] Nonetheless, those in Congress who are gravely concerned with the risks posed by the President’s deal are faced with an ineluctable political fact:  the deal will not be stopped. Under the constitutionally questionable scheme set forth in the Iran Nuclear Review Act, a veto proof majority of Congress must be assembled to prevent the President from permanently “waiving” the legislatively mandated sanctions upon the Iranian regime, and that is almost certainly not going to happen, particularly given the partisan split that has dominated the debate.

Yet recognizing the political realities that make forestalling the deal all but impossible does not mean that Congress is left without power to affect positively the policy of the United States toward Iran.  To the contrary, the legislature has the ability – indeed, we contend, the responsibility – to insist that any implementation of the Iran deal be accompanied by two critical components:

(i) Congress can vote to authorize the President and his successors to use force in the event that Iran engages in any material or otherwise ongoing violation of the deal, or if the regime ever takes steps to pursue the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems, whether during or after the pendency of the deal. And Congress can insist that the President declare that it is the express policy of the United States to use such force in the event of Iranian regime violations; and

(ii) Congress can demand that the President publicly adopt a plan to systematically counter Iran’s support for terror – as well as its support for proxy armies and mass murderous regimes – throughout the greater Middle East.

The need for these crucial components is beginning to be recognized, even by many supporters of the President’s deal with the Iranian regime, and therefore can and should be a subject of bipartisan agreement in the midst of a freighted debate.


The deal the President struck with the Iranian dictatorship has five critical deficiencies that warrant particular attention, and – we submit – necessitate the legislative corrections we address herein:The deal obviates Congress’s statutory commitment to end Iran’s WMD programs, and instead expressly accepts Iran’s permanent status as a nuclear weapons threshold state. Indeed, by its terms, the deal permits the regime to upgrade to state-of- the-art centrifuges during its limited pendency, and thereafter leaves Iran free to enrich an unlimited amount of fuel to weapons grade levels upon the deal’s termination – a state of affairs that leading experts have deemed gravely dangerous;[4]

(i) The deal virtually abandons the legislatively enshrined commitment to seek the termination Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile program and expressly permits Iran to purchase such systems from Russia or China in the future if it cannot build them itself – this despite the fact that such weapons have no practical purpose other than to deliver nuclear and other WMD weapons;

(ii) The deal imposes a series of roadblocks to inspections of undeclared nuclear sites, this despite the fact that Iran has a history of cheating on binding commitments by pursuing its nuclear weapons programs in exactly such sites, including the massive Fordo bunker that it built under the noses of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.[5] Furthermore, U.S. Energy Secretary Moniz has admitted to Congress that the lengthy delays upon inspections of undeclared nuclear sites that are built into the deal may make it impossible to uncover some illicit activities, including the testing of nuclear bomb triggers;[6]

(iii) The deal allows the Iranian regime to keep virtually entirely secret if, and how, it will finally provide answers regarding its past nuclear weapons programs.[7] Indeed, the administration has recently come close to outrightly abandoning its prior unequivocal commitment to obtaining an account of Iran’s development of triggers and other nuclear weapons components prior to the “waiver” of sanctions;[8] and perhaps of most immediate importance,

(iv) The deal imposes absolutely no limitations on Iran’s systematic support for terrorism and subversion throughout the greater Middle East and the world, even as the U.S. will allow the theocratic regime to pump hundreds of billions of dollars into its coffers.[9]


As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, the Constitution vests Congress with the authority to Congress “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”[10] Congress has done just that where Iran is concerned by imposing a comprehensive scheme of sanctions and coordinating with the Executive Branch in imposing others. Congress has also done so by expressly linking the termination of those sanctions with the dismantling of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, as well as the termination of its engagement in and sponsorship of terrorism and mass murder.

For example, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 provides that the sanctions against Iran may not be terminated by the President unless and until the Iranian regime:

(i) Has ceased providing support for acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism; and

(ii) Has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.[11]

The President’s Iran deal directly obviates both of these legislative mandates. First, it does so by affording Iran regime sanctions relief without mandating any change in the Iranian regime’s expanding sponsorship of international terrorism and subversion from the borders of Israel to Syria and Yemen. Second, it does so by affirmatively establishing Iran’s otherwise absurdly asserted “right” to maintain and further develop the industrial uranium enrichment infrastructure that will allow it ultimately to manufacture a large fleet of nuclear weapons.

One might reasonably expect that Congress would have to pass legislation to effectuate such an about face in longstanding United States policy. This is particularly the case because the agreement embodies  dramatic change that was entered into with the dictatorship of Iran and is reflected in a United Nations resolution that the administration’s supporters contend has the force of international law, even if it does not expressly purport to bind Congress. As a number of constitutional scholars have compellingly argued, given the qualitative nature and scope of the policy reversal embodied in the agreement with the Iranian theocracy, the agreement necessarily falls within the scope of the Constitution’s Treaty Clause, thus mandating an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senate before it can be effectuated.[12]

In January 2014 testimony before Congress, Secretary of State Kerry acknowledged that the President was “obligated . . . under the law” to seek congressional approval of any deal with Iran, and expressly committed the administration to seeking such approval.[13] In July of 2015, however, Secretary Kerry explained that the President had chosen not to comply with the procedures called for under Treaty Clause, not because his analysis of governing constitutional law had changed, but rather because the administration had concluded that it would be politically impossible to obtain the requisite legislative approval.[14] Remarkably, the administration takes the position that, because it would be politically impracticable for the President to obtain the supermajority vote of the Senate that the Treaty Clause mandates, the constitutional requirement should be treated as a nullity.

Indeed, after it became clear that the President would face an uphill battle in obtaining Congressional approval of any kind for his deal, he sought to evade Congress entirely. The President chose to take advantage of the fact that the critical sanctions statutes contain provisions allowing for presidential “waivers,” e.g., where a waiver is deemed to be in the national interest, while others sanctions have been imposed by the Executive Branch in coordination with Congress, rather than under the express terms of statutes.

Soon after announcing the President’s entry into a “framework” agreement with Iran in April 2015, the Administration indicated that it intended to use its “waiver” authority to essentially terminate any and all congressionally imposed sanctions without the involvement of the legislature. Thus, the President’s representatives stated, Congress only would be given an opportunity to review and consider the “termination” of the sanctions regime many years after the agreement had been implemented, and thus long after the sanctions regime had been “waived” into nonexistence.

The sheer and transparent disingenuousness of the President’s proposal, however, rendered it untenable. Accordingly, the President and his allies were forced to accept the passage of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act of 2015, which requires the President to afford Congress a period of time to review the agreement and assessment, during which “the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement….”

During this period, which, due to repeated delays in the completion of the negotiations with the Iranian regime, will extend for a period of at least 60 days, Congress will be able to review, and ultimately take a vote, on whether to approve of the President’s effectively permanent “waiver” of the critical sanctions upon the Iranian regime.

While the President made it plain that he disfavored any Congressional review of his Iran deal whatsoever, he “accepted” the Nuclear Agreement Act because it turns the normal structure of legislative approval on its head by requiring a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress to prevent the effective nullification of existing law. Thus, rather than the supermajority affirmative Senate vote required under the Treaty Clause, the President’s agreement will go forward unless a supermajority of both houses votes against it.

Furthermore, the President and his Secretary of State have demonstrated a very thinly veiled contempt for the congressional review that was foisted upon them. Secretary of State Kerry has mockingly described his former congressional colleagues as “535 Secretaries of State,”[15] and he and the President have publicly stated that it will be of no concern to them if a majority of both houses of Congress disapprove the deal. Plainly, the President has concluded, if a supermajority of Congress cannot be marshaled to oppose the deal, the meddlesome legislature will not be able to have any further impact on the about face in U.S. policy toward the Iranian regime that the President has engineered.


While the President’s effort to systemically undermine Congress’s legislative authority may well be at odds with the Constitution, many observers have concluded that the cake is baked regarding the legislative fate of the deal. It is plain that marshaling a two-thirds vote against the “waiver” scheme in both houses of a polarized Congress is highly unlikely, particularly given that the President has made it plain that votes against the deal even by the most skeptical Democrats will be viewed as political betrayals.

Yet Congress is not, in fact, faced with the binary choice of overriding a presidential veto, on the one hand, and allowing the deal to proceed in unaltered form, on the other. Rather, Congress has the ability – and we submit the obligation – to “retrofit” the bad deal by insisting that it be accompanied by an unambiguous commitment on the part of the Congress and President to use force to prevent Iran’s regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon if and when the regime cheats as well as an unambiguous commitment systemically to counter the regime’s state terror and subversion schemes.


Before the deal was announced, a group of experts—including several former Obama administration officials—issued a public letter under the auspices of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stating the elements that would be necessary for deterring Iran’s regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon (the “WINEP Letter”).[16]

Unsurprisingly, a number of those elements are absent from the bargain the President ultimately struck with the regime, including “timely and effective access” by inspectors to “any sites” in Iran, a complete account of prior Iranian nuclear weapons development work before any sanctions relief is granted, a bar on the rapid upgrade of Iran’s centrifuge fleet during the pendency of the deal, and an allowance for congressional review in advance of a U.N. Security Council vote in favor of the deal on behalf of the United States.

Each one of these grave deficiencies might, per the authors of the WINEP Letter, be sufficient to merit opposing the deal. But as the authors of the letter emphasized, one element is far and away the “[m]ost important[]”:

[I]t is vital for the United States to affirm that it is U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon – or otherwise acquiring or building one – both during the agreement and after it expires. Precisely because Iran will be left as a nuclear threshold state (and has clearly preserved the option of becoming a nuclear weapon state), the United States must go on record now that it is committed to using all means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. The President should declare this to be U.S. policy and Congress should formally endorse it.[17]

Since the announcement of the deal, one of the authors of the WINEP Letter, former Obama administration official and ambassador, Dennis Ross, has reiterated the necessity for expressly and unequivocally placing the United States on the record with a commitment to use force if the Iranian regime moves forward with the development of a nuclear weapon before or after the time-limited pendency of the deal. As Ross has explained, such an express declaration is required because the regime’s past behavior, and its now permanent status as a weapons threshold state, make it a virtual certainty that the regime will violate the terms of the deal absent decisive deterrence.[18]

Yet, as Ross and others have also observed, the United States’ own recent course of conduct, particularly during the Obama administration, has led the Iranian regime to conclude that the United States will not resort to force, regardless of the scope of the regime’s misconduct. Furthermore, as Israel’s former U.S. Ambassador Michael Oren and others have explained, the administration’s retreat from its red line against the use of chemical weapons by the Iranian client dictatorship in Syria has only rendered Iran’s theocrats all the more certain that their inevitable moves toward nuclear weapons development will not be met by force. Additionally, the fact that the President and his Secretary of State have repeatedly suggested that force would be ineffective against the Iranian regime – and have criticized opponents for their purported eagerness to use force – reveals the President’s fecklessness when it comes to meeting Iranian misconduct with force.

Accordingly, even vocal supporters of the deal such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman have joined Ross and other signatories to the WINEP Letter in calling for the Congress to issue an authorization for the use of military force – presumably pursuant to the terms of the War Powers Resolution – providing that the President is authorized to use force in response to any material violation of the deal or any post-deal move toward weapons grade uranium enrichment by the Iranian regime. Per Friedman:

Congress should pass a resolution authorizing this and future presidents to use force to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear weapons state. Iran must know now that the U.S. president is authorized to destroy — without warning or negotiation — any attempt by Tehran to build a bomb.[19]

Yet as the reasoning of Ross and the other signatories to the WINEP Letter have made plain, an authorization for the use of force is an absolutely necessary, but not sufficient, element in retrofitting the Iran deal. The President also must be called upon to affirm, and affirm unambiguously, that he intends to use the authority granted by Congress if and when it proves necessary, as must each of his prospective successors.

Indeed, a group of former U.S. diplomats who recently wrote the Congress strongly to endorse the deal has expressly stated as much:

The Administration must make clear that it will remain the firm policy of the United States during the agreement and beyond, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon by all necessary means.[20]

Thus, Congress must insist upon a presidential commitment that a strike against Iran will not simply be “on the table” as an option – as the President and Secretary of State Kerry have vaguely stated – but rather that force will be the inevitable outcome of any effort by the Iranian theocracy to move forward with its nuclear weapons project, whether through enrichment or otherwise.

Only such a unified and unambiguous declaration of intent from both the Legislative and Executive Branches of government holds the promise of reestablishing the credible threat of overwhelming force that even supporters of the President’s deal are now coming to recognize as essential for the United States and its allies to have any hope of preventing the Iranian regime from moving from a threshold nuclear state to a nuclear-bomb and intercontinental-ballistic-missile state.

The need for the foregoing steps by Congress and the President should not be controversial, as evidenced by the fact that advocates for the pact have endorsed it.

Indeed, we submit that those members of Congress who are not willing to vote to disapprove the deal have all the greater obligation to ensure that such a message of deterrence is reinstituted after Iran’s maintenance of its industrial nuclear infrastructure receives a U.S. imprimatur.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has observed that the President’s deal with the Iranian regime does nothing to counter the regime’s systemically malign conduct in the greater Middle East, which “run[s] the gamut from ballistic missile technology to weapons trafficking, to the use of surrogates and proxies to naval mines and undersea activity — and last but not least, to malicious activity in cyberspace.”[21] Furthermore, as part of the deal, the President rejected the publicly stated advice of General Dempsey, and agreed to forego the current arms embargoes, including eventually respecting ballistic missile technology, against Iran.[22]

While the President and his advocates have repeatedly likened the administration’s Iran policy to President Reagan’s approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union, the reality could hardly be more different. Reagan, like Carter before him, accompanied negotiations with the U.S.S.R. with aggressive efforts to counter Soviet expansionism and subversion, most notably in Afghanistan. By contrast, the President has – in the words of Washington Post reporter David Ignatius – gotten the “slows” in countering Iran’s massive campaigns of state terror, most notably in Syria.[23]

While the foundational proposition of cold war détente, commencing with Nixon, was that negotiations with the Soviet regime necessarily had to be accompanied by active opposition to its support of subversion and state terror, Obama was concerned that remaining faithful to the longstanding U.S. policy of countering Iranian terror would “blow up” his long sought deal with the Iranian theocracy. The predictable result has been a dramatic expansion of Iran’s campaigns of terror and subversion, even as the regime’s resources were constrained by sanctions and decreased oil prices.

Some presidential advisors, including Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, have suggested that, with the deal in the bag, the President will soon abruptly change course, and comply with his legislative mandate to counter Iran’s state terrorism and subversion.[24] At the same time, however, others – including Secretary of State Kerry – have made directly contrary suggestions, more than hinting that they wish to entice Iran into becoming a U.S. ally, rather than to counter the Iranian regime’s increasingly aggressive projections of power and funding of terrorism.

Furthermore, Secretary Kerry has publicly resisted the proposition that Iran’s regime is actually committed to wiping Israel off the map and murdering Americans, suggesting that the rhetoric of the theocrats should be ignored. Thus, Kerry has stated that if the Supreme Leader’s routine genocidal pronouncements actually reflect the “policy [of Iran], it’s very disturbing,” but has made plain that he is not convinced that this is so. The fact that the regime routinely supplied bombs to kill U.S. troops in Iraq and missiles for purposes of terrorizing Israel on two of its borders apparently is not a convincing enough an indication for the President’s chief diplomat that the regime is not lying about its repeatedly stated intentions.

Indeed, some in the administration have floated the absurd proposition that the U.S. might somehow resolve the cataclysm in Syria by cooperating with Iran, even though the necessary price of any such cooperation would be the preservation of the arms pipeline that Hezbollah uses permanently to destabilize Lebanon and to transport the thousands of missiles and other weapons it uses to place Israel under a constant and expanding threat of destruction.[25] Such mixed messages sow the seeds for granting Iran license to engage in even more grave destabilization in the region.

As experts, including the signatories to the WINEP Letter have observed, the time for the “slows” has ended, and the United States must now decisively, systematically, and publicly, commit to reinstituting its policy of countering Iranian power in the region, including by:

(i) Sidelining (rather than collaborating with) Iranian backed and controlled militia in Iraq in favor of Pershmerga, vetted Sunni, and Iraqi government forces;

(ii) Finally acting to train and equip non-extremist opposition fighters in Syria, splitting off forces from the weakened and Iran-backed Assad regime, and systemically interdicting Iranian weapons shipments to the Assad regime;

(iii) Setting out to split the Houthi elements away from Iran in Yemen;

(iv) Likewise interdicting Iranian arms shipments to extremist groups throughout the region and aggressively countering Iranian efforts to harass and threaten the free flow of shipping traffic; and

(v) Most importantly, reaffirming U.S. policy to oppose Iran’s efforts to subvert local governments and project its power at the expense of our friends and allies.

Furthermore, Secretary Carter has testified that U.S. allies in the Middle East are looking to the United States unequivocally to declare its commitment to pursue such a comprehensive program to counter Iranian state terror and subversion.[26]

Such an ambitious recommitment to longstanding U.S. policy will require a clear message from the President, a message that should – like the authorization for the use of military force – accompany the vote on the nuclear deal. Once again, it is Congressional advocates for approval of the President’s deal who bear the primary onus for ensuring that the administration definitively commits to, and thereafter implements, such an unambiguous return to the nation’s longstanding policy of countering Iran’s terror fueled campaign for regional hegemony.


Some members of Congress have justifiably criticized the Iran deal as a constitutionally questionable effort to nullify both Congress’s power to regulate commerce and the Senate’s authority to consent to, or reject, treaties. But the deal does not merely present challenge to the constitutionally proper allocation of power among the coordinate branches of our government, it also threatens to pave the way toward the further deterioration of the increasingly fragile situation in a Middle East riven with Iranian misconduct and subversion.

For that reason, legislators – regardless of whether, or especially if, they choose not to oppose the deal – bear a responsibility to ensure that the deal is accompanied by two critical elements: First, an unmistakable and unified message from the Executive and Legislative Branches that any effort by the Iranian regime to move toward building a nuclear weapon will be met with force. Second, a systemic reinstitution of U.S. efforts to counter Iranian terrorism and efforts to undermine U.S. allies.



* David R. Lurie is a partner in the law firm of Saito Sorenson Lurie LLP.

** Robert Steinbuch is a Professor of Law at the UALR Bowen School of Law and a Fulbright Scholar.

[1] David Ignatius, After the nuclear deal, how to contain Iran’s meddling in the Middle East, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 16, 2015), Obama has had the “slows” in Syria, in part because he did not want to confront Iran’s proxy force there, the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, and risk blowing up the nuclear talks.

[2] Brian Bennett, Iran unlikely to spend most of its post-sanctions funds on militants, CIA says, L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2015),

[3] Michael Wilner, Top US general distances himself from choice of Iran deal or war, JERUSALEM POST (July 29, 2015),

[4] Public Statement on U.S. Policy Toward the Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Endorsed by a Bipartisan Group of American Diplomats, Legislators, Policymakers, and Experts, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (June 24, 2015),

[5] Michael R. Gordon, Verification Process in Iran Deal Is Questioned by Some Experts, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 22, 2015),

[6] Cabinet Secretaries on Iran Nuclear Agreement, C-SPAN (July 28, 2015), (2:32:26, 3:22:55).

[7] Fred Fleitz, IAEA Tells Congressmen of Two Secret Side Deals to Iran Agreement That Won’t Be Shared with Congress, NATIONAL REVIEW (July 22, 2015, 4:00 AM),

[8] Jay Solomon, Lawmakers Say Iran Unlikely to Address Suspicions of Secret Weapons Program:  U.S. administration says full disclosure about program’s history isn’t critical to verify future commitments, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 26, 2015, 7:32 PM),

[9] Supra note 4.

[10] Zivitofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (quoting U.S. Const., Art I, § 8).

[11] Diane E. Rennack, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW (July 15, 2015),

[12] E.g., Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal Unconstitutional?, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 15, 2015),

[13] Kerry: ‘Under Law’ Obama Admin Needs Congressional Approval of Iran Deal, THE WASHINGTON FREE BEACON (April 8, 2014 11:45 AM),

[14] Jack Goldsmith, More Weak Arguments for the Illegality of the Iran Deal, LAWFARE (July 27, 2015, 2:46 PM),

[15]  Supra note 13.

[16] Supra note 4.

[17] Id.

[18] Dennis Ross, Iran Will Cheat. Then What?, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (July 15, 2015),

[19] Thomas L. Friedman, Backing Up Our Wager With Iran, THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 22, 2015), ; Accord Norm Ornstein, How Congress Can Improve the Iran Deal, THE ATLANTIC (July 20, 2015), (arguing for congressional approval, but stating that there must be “a commitment to use every avenue, including force, if Iran violates the basics of the deal and moves toward a nuclear weapon”).

[20] Joe Cirincione, Israel Ambassadors Support Deal With Iran, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2015, 11:59 AM),

[21] Michael Bowman, US Lawmakers Seek Details of Iran Nuke Inspection Regime, VOA (July 31, 2015)

[22] Press Release, Kelly Ayotte, In Response to Ayotte, Carter and Dempsey Oppose Lifting Arms Restrictions on Iran (July 7, 2015),; (quoting Dempsey testimony that deal should not include termination on conventional arm embargoes, including respecting ballistic missile technology); Iran Nuclear Agreement, C-SPAN (July 29, 2015), (Dempsey testimony acknowledging that his advice was not followed at 03.15:59).

[23] Supra note 1. The U.S. also reportedly began limiting its longstanding, and successful, joint efforts with Israel to counter the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. Ronan Bergman, What Information Collected by Israeli Intelligence Reveals About the Iran Talks, TABLET (July 29, 2015),  Extraordinarily, it appears that the President’s deal will require the United States affirmatively to assist the Iranian regime in countering any future Israeli efforts to subvert the Iranian nuclear program through use of information technology, such as the previously, extraordinarily successful, use of the Stuxnet computer virus.  See also, Iran Nuclear Agreement, C-SPAN (July 29, 2015), (testifying at 2:00:30).

[24] Iran Nuclear Agreement, C-SPAN (July 29, 2015), (testifying at 02:07:20).

[25] Michael Crowley, Obama eyes next diplomatic steps with Iran, POLITICO (July 27, 2015, 2:35 PM),

[26] Supra note 24 (testifying at 02:07:20).

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